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Abstract 
When the riskiness of an asset increases, then, arguably, some risk-averse agents that 
were previously willing to hold on to the asset are no longer willing to do so. Aumann and 
Serrano (2008) have recently proposed an index of riskiness that helps to make this intuition 
rigorous. We use their index to analyze the riskiness of corporate bonds and how this can 
change over time and across rating classes and how it compares to the riskiness of other 
financial instruments. We find statistically significant evidence that a number of financial 
and macroeconomic variables can predict time-variation in the riskiness of corporate bonds, 
including in ways one might not expect. For example, a higher yield-to-maturity lowers 
riskiness by reducing the frequency and the magnitude of negative holding-period returns. 
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    1 Introduction1
Running a Google search for the phrase "corporate bonds are riskier than government bonds"
we found more than 400 documents containing the exact phrase, including newspaper articles,
academic books, scholarly articles, university course handouts, educational websites and invest-
ment bank brochures. Although such statement appears to be common wisdom, there does not
seem to be much consensus on the exact meaning of the adjective "riskier" utilized to compare
corporate and government bonds. While some do not clarify what they mean by riskier, others
specify that corporate bonds are riskier because there is a greater chance that the underlying
loan does not get repaid in full; others explain that, historically, corporate bond investors have
experienced more volatile returns; others observe that the prices of corporate bonds are more
sensitive to economic activity and interest rate movements; others state that corporate bonds
are riskier because they are less liquid than government bonds. These explanations are often
complemented by further information: for example, some state that only investors who are more
risk tolerant can invest in corporate bonds and others say that corporate bonds are riskier than
government bonds, but they are less risky than stocks.
Such wealth of characterizations of the relative riskiness of corporate and government bonds
re￿ ects, among other things, the lack of a widely agreed de￿nition of risk. As we will discuss
in more detail later, several de￿nitions of risk have been proposed in the literature, but none of
them seems exempt from critiques and general enough to gain widespread acceptance. This is
at odds with the fact that risk aversion is, instead, a very well-established concept: in fact, most
economists are used to think of risk aversion as the concavity of a utility function, de￿ned in a
von-Neumann Morgenstern expected utility framework. Hence, trying to link the concept of risk
to that of risk aversion seems a very promising avenue to be explored in the search for a widely
accepted de￿nition of risk. Recently, Aumann and Serrano (2008) have given an important
contribution in this direction. They have provided a characterization of risk that is based on
a simple but powerful idea: a gamble is riskier when there are more risk averse agents that do
not accept it. Building on this idea, they have proposed an intuitively appealing measure of
riskiness, dubbed ￿ economic index of riskiness￿ , de￿ned as follows: the index of riskiness R(g) of
a gamble g is the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) of an individual with constant
ARA who is indi⁄erent between taking and not taking the gamble g. They prove that the index
of riskiness thus de￿ned can be given a rigorous axiomatic characterization and satis￿es a number
of important properties, among which monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance and
sub-additivity.
We discuss statistical estimation of Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index of riskiness. Thanks
to its computational tractability, the index is also very amenable to statistical estimation. We
propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator of the index of riskiness, that can be
used when we observe multiple draws from the payo⁄ distribution of a gamble. Furthermore, we
introduce a conditional version of the index, to accommodate the possibility that the distribution
of payo⁄s be conditionally dependent on some set of predetermined variables. Roughly speaking,
we allow the index of riskiness to be a function R(g;X) of a vector of variables X that can be
observed prior to the realization of the payo⁄ g. The theory of GMM estimation of the index of
riskiness we propose is used in this paper to study the riskiness of corporate bonds. However, the
theory is fully general and could be used to analyze holding-period returns on any other asset
class.
1Any views expressed in this article are the author￿ s and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Italy.
I wish to thank Paolo Angelini, Emanuela Ciapanna, Giuseppe Grande, Giovanni Guazzarotti, Aviram Levy, Juri
Marcucci, Giulio Nicoletti, Fabio Panetta, Marcello Pericoli, as well as seminar participants at the Bank of Italy,
for providing comments on previous versions of the paper.
5Estimation of the index of riskiness allows us to give rigorous empirical content to statements
like "corporate bonds are riskier than government bonds". More generally, we study the riskiness
of corporate bonds, how it varies across rating classes, how it compares to the riskiness of other
￿nancial instruments and how it relates to a set of macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables. The
analysis is focused on the returns obtained in the past by replicating some popular indices of
investment grade US corporate bonds, broadly subdivided by categories of rating.
First, we estimate the unconditional riskiness of the bond indices and we make comparisons
between corporate bonds belonging to di⁄erent rating classes, stocks and government bonds. We
do not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between the riskiness of di⁄erent rating classes,
except for the A class, which is signi￿cantly riskier than than the AA and AAA classes. The
estimated riskiness is not monotonically decreasing with the rating class, as BBB-rated bonds
are estimated to be less risky than A-rated bonds. We also test the hypothesis that corporate
bonds and government bonds are equally risky and we are not able to reject the hypothesis at a
high con￿dence level, except again for the A class. Stocks are instead signi￿cantly riskier than
corporate bonds, their index of riskiness being more than ten times higher. Finally, departures
from normality increase estimated riskiness, although the increase is not statistically signi￿cant
in our sample.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we study the conditional dependence of riski-
ness on a number of macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables. Estimating univariate models, we
￿nd statistically signi￿cant evidence that the riskiness of corporate bonds varies in tandem with
interest rates, the TED spread (a measure of funding liquidity equal to the di⁄erence between
the LIBOR and the T-Bill rate), industrial production, the past trend and volatility of the stock
market, the yield-to-maturity of corporate bonds and an adaptive forecast of the conditional
volatility of corporate bond returns. Estimating multivariate models, we encounter statistical
problems that resemble those found in the literature on the predictability of stock and bond
returns (see e.g. A￿t Sahalia and Brandt - 2001 for a discussion): while several variables individ-
ually predict riskiness, it is hard to build statistically sound multivariate models with more than
few predictors. Despite these di¢ culties, a number of parsimonious multivariate models allow to
highlight several features of the dynamic behavior of riskiness. As one would expect, riskiness
is higher when the conditional volatility of returns is higher. However, volatility alone is not
su¢ cient to capture all the time-variation in riskiness. Other variables, considered together with
volatility, are statistically signi￿cant predictors of riskiness. One of them is the yield-to-maturity
of corporate bonds, which is negatively associated with riskiness. In our sample, a high yield-to-
maturity predicts high positive holding period returns and lower riskiness. This ￿nding is worth
stressing. Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index of riskiness has one important merit with respect
to more traditional measures of risk such as variance: the economic index of riskiness takes into
account the fact that expected return is an important component of riskiness; if, ceteris paribus,
you increase the expected return of an asset, its riskiness diminishes, because you are decreasing
the probability of facing low-payo⁄ states. Roughly speaking, our empirical ￿ndings suggest
that a higher yield-to-maturity decreases the probability of disappointing returns on corporate
bonds, hence diminishing their riskiness. Besides forecasts of conditional volatility and the yield-
to-maturity, some macroeconomic variables provide additional forecasting power, especially for
lower-rated bonds. In￿ ation seems to be the most important: corporate bonds tend to be riskier
in periods of high in￿ ation. This is consistent with the evidence provided, inter alia, by Gordon
(1982), Wadhwani (1986) and Valckx (2004), who ￿nd various channels through which high in￿ a-
tion can increase the probability of corporate defaults and of disappointing returns on corporate
bonds.
Predictable changes in the probabilistic distributions of asset returns have been studied by
￿nancial economists for many decades. Typically, the focus has been on predicting the ￿rst two
6conditional moments of the distributions, namely expected returns (e.g.: Ferson and Harvey -
1991 and Cochrane - 1991) and variances (e.g.: Bollerslev -1986, Schwert - 1989, Whitelaw - 1994).
Our paper is naturally connected with this literature, but rather than studying the predictability
of individual moments, we study the predictability of riskiness, a characteristic of the distribution
of asset returns that is closely related to the choices of risk-averse agents and can, in principle,
depend on all moments of the distribution. From this point of view, our paper is similar in
spirit to a paper by A￿t Sahalia and Brandt (2001): they study the optimal use of information
in portfolio allocation decisions and they argue that, rather than predicting individual moments
of the distribution of asset returns in order to form optimal portfolio allocations, it is better to
directly predict the optimal portfolio allocations themselves, since they may have a non-trivial
dependence on many moments of the distribution, as well as on preference parameters.
While corporate bonds have been the subject of many studies, attention has focused mainly
on the determinants of corporate bond spreads (e.g.: Kwan - 1996, Du⁄ee - 1998, Collin-Dufresne
et al. - 2001, Campbell and Taksler - 2003) and on expected returns (e.g.: Lamont - 1998, Baker
et al. - 2003). We are not aware of any study that speci￿cally dealt with the riskiness of corporate
bonds and its predictability. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ￿rst to
deal with statistical estimation of Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index of riskiness and to use it
to conduct an empirical investigation of the riskiness of an asset class.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces Aumann and Serrano￿ s
(2008) index and discusses its interpretation; Section 3 discusses GMM estimation of the index
of riskiness; Section 4 presents the empirical analysis; Section 5 discusses directions for further
research; Section 6 concludes.
2 Aumann and Serrano￿ s index of riskiness
Although measuring and understanding ￿nancial risk is on top of the agenda of ￿nancial econo-
mists and policy makers, it is often unclear how risk should be de￿ned and measured and how it
could be monitored and predicted.
Since the seminal contributions of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958), variance has been
extensively used as a measure of the riskiness of a payo⁄prospect, to be traded o⁄with expected
return, a measure of attractiveness of the payo⁄ itself. Casting the problem of portfolio selection
in terms of a trade-o⁄ between mean and variance of returns has had an enormous success, due
also to the analytical tractability and clear intuitive meaning of this framework. However, many
studies (e.g.: Dybvig and Ingersoll - 1982, Bigelow - 1993, Jarrow and Madan - 1997, Maccheroni
et al. - 2009) have highlighted the fact that an investor ranking investment prospects based on
their variance and expected return may violate non satiation2, one of the basic tenets of economic
rationality. Furthermore, outside a mean-variance framework, using variance alone as a measure
of the riskiness of an investment prospect may be very misleading. Consider, for example, two
gambles g and h, such that g = h+c, where c is a strictly positive constant. Clearly, any rational
decision-maker would strictly prefer g to h, but, according to a ranking based on variance alone,
g and h are equally risky. This is an important shortfall of using variance to measure riskiness:
often, a ranking of riskiness based on variance does not provide any meaningful indication on
how rational risk-averse agents actually rank gambles.
Several other measures of riskiness have been proposed (Value-at-Risk, semi-variance, inverse
Sharpe ratio, expected shortfall, etc.), but none of them is exempt from critiques and no consensus
2The main intuition behind this result is that variance increases not only with negative deviations from the
mean, but also with positive deviations; hence, an investor that ranks investment prospects based on variance
(and mean) may sometimes prefer less to more, because she dislikes investment prospects that generate positive
deviations from the mean.
7has been reached yet on a ￿rst best. Some authors (e.g.: Artzner et al. - 1999 and F￿llmer and
Schied - 2002) have proposed sets of desirable properties (so called ￿ coherency￿axioms) that a
risk measure should satisfy. However, others (see, again, Aumann and Serrano - 2008 and the
references cited therein) have shown that risk measures satisfying such ￿ coherency￿properties
may fail to satisfy other equally desirable properties such as monotonicity with respect to ￿rst-
and second-order stochastic dominance.
Recently, Aumann and Serrano (2008) have proposed an intuitively appealing measure of
riskiness, dubbed ￿ economic index of riskiness￿ , that enjoys several important properties and is
based on the well-established concept of risk aversion, as de￿ned in a von-Neumann Morgenstern
expected utility framework. Aumann and Serrano (2008) de￿ne the riskiness R(g) of a gamble3
g as the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) of an individual with constant ARA
who is indi⁄erent between taking and not taking the gamble g. Their paper contains two main
contributions. First, they show that ordering gambles according to R(g) is rationalizable under a
simple and intuitively appealing set of behavioral axioms. Second, they provide a straightforward
way of calculating R(g). Precisely, they prove that the riskiness of a gamble g is the unique










where E denotes expected value.
In other words, the riskiness R is equal to the inverse of the Laplace transform of the distri-
bution of g evaluated at the point 1.
The index of riskiness thus de￿ned satis￿es the two axioms of duality and positive homogene-
ity, de￿ned below.
It is assumed that agents￿preferences are described by von-Neumann Morgenstern utility
functions that are strictly monotonic, strictly concave and twice continuously di⁄erentiable. An
agent with utility function u accepts gamble g at wealth w if:
E[u(w + g)] > u(w) (2)
An agent i is said to be uniformly no less risk averse than agent j if, whenever i accepts a gamble
at some wealth, then j accepts that gamble at any wealth. An agent i is said to be uniformly
more risk averse than agent j if i is uniformly no less risk averse than j and j is not uniformly
no less risk averse than i.
Let g and h be two gambles. An index of riskiness R() satis￿es duality if, whenever R(g) >
R(h), i is uniformly more risk averse than j and i accepts g at w, then j accepts h at w. Stated
di⁄erently, if a gamble g is riskier than h according to the index R() and agent i accepts the
riskier gamble g, then, a fortiori, agent j, who is less risk averse, accepts the less risky gamble
h. An index of riskiness R() satis￿es homogeneity if, for any positive number t and any gamble
g, R(tg) = tR(g). Roughly speaking, when you double a bet you also double its riskiness.
Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index of riskiness satis￿es the two axioms of duality and positive
homogeneity. Most notably, any index of riskiness satisfying these two axioms is a positive
multiple of Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index. This is a remarkable result, because the two
axioms are very weak, i.e. they require very little from an index of riskiness. The index also enjoys
other important properties. While we refer the reader to the original paper for an exhaustive list,
let us mention a very important one: the index is also compatible with an ordering of gambles
based on ￿rst- or second-order stochastic dominance; if a gamble g stochastically dominates a
3A gamble g is de￿ned to be a real-valued random variable with positive expectation and some negative values
(i.e. E[g] > 0 and P[g < 0] > 0).
8gamble h, either under the ￿rst- or the second-order criterion, then, according to the index R, g
is less risky than h (i.e. R(g) < R(h)).
Hart (2008) has proposed a di⁄erent set of behavioral axioms, from which he has also been
able to derive Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index of riskiness. He has introduced a very simple
￿riskier than￿order between gambles, based on the intuition that a riskier gamble is rejected
more often: given a set of risk-averse agents, a riskier gamble is rejected by a greater number of
agents. Hart (2008) has proved that also his "riskier than" order can be represented by Aumann
and Serrano￿ s (2008) index.
The rest of the paper will be concerned with estimating how the riskiness of ￿nancial assets
changes in time (as predictors of the conditional distribution of returns change) and in space
(considering di⁄erent ￿nancial instruments). It is then important to discuss how to interpret
changes in the index of riskiness. The ￿rst interpretation is ordinal. Suppose you observe an
increase in the index of riskiness of an asset. The increase implies that some risk-averse agents
that were previously willing to hold the asset, now are no longer willing to hold it. This squares
exactly with the idea that risk is what risk-averse agents avert. The second interpretation is
cardinal. Suppose the index of riskiness of an asset doubles. Then, if a certain agent was
indi⁄erent between investing or not investing 1$ in the asset, now (after the increase) you have to
halve the investment to 0.5$ to make him indi⁄erent again. This is a consequence of the positive
homogeneity of the index. There are also other more sophisticated interpretations, related to
the behavior of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) agents. Since these interpretations are
not directly relevant to the empirical study presented below, we do not treat them here and refer
the reader to the discussion in Aumann and Serrano (2008).
3 GMM estimation of the index of riskiness
3.1 Estimating unconditional riskiness
In this section we discuss GMM estimation of the index of riskiness.
GMM estimation of the index of riskiness R exploits the population moment condition derived
from (1):









The following proposition, proved in the Appendix, presents the GMM estimator of R and
states su¢ cient conditions for its consistency.
Proposition 1 (Consistency - Unconditional riskiness) Let fgtgt=1;:::;T be the ￿rst T el-
ements of an ergodic and stationary sequence of draws from the distribution of g. Let E[g] > 0
and P[g < 0] > 0, so that g has an index of riskiness R 2 R++. Let the support of g be bounded.
Let u;l 2 R++ and l < R < u. Let b R be the GMM estimator of R de￿ned by:











Then b R converges in probability to R as T tends to in￿nity.
9Note that the proposition assumes that the parameter space is bounded and has strictly
positive elements (b R 2 [l;u]). This is necessary because r = 0 is a point of discontinuity of
m(g;r); furthermore, also r = 1 is always a solution of E[m(g;r)] = 0. In practice, the
assumption that b R 2 [l;u] is not restrictive, because l and u can be respectively set equal to any
arbitrarily small and large positive numbers such that [l;u] certainly includes R according to the
researcher￿ s judgement. Note also that, whenever the empirical distribution de￿ned by the T
draws fgtgt=1;:::;T has positive expectation and negative values with positive probability, there
exists a ￿nite and strictly positive solution of the sample moment condition4:
QT (r) = 0 (7)
In this case, the minimum in (5) is attained at 0 and it is equivalent to solve either (5) or (7).
The following proposition gives a set of su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic normality of
the estimator b R.
Proposition 2 (Asymptotic normality - Unconditional riskiness) Let all the conditions




in distribution to a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and strictly positive variance










b R ￿ R
￿
converges in distribution to a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance V = S
D2:
Furthermore, if there exists a random variable b S converging in probability to S as T tends to















converges in probability to V .
The assumption that 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;R) converges in distribution to a multivariate normal
distribution with mean zero and strictly positive variance S could be replaced by sets of more
primitive assumptions. For example, in the case fgtgt=1;:::;T is a sequence of independent draws
from the distribution of g, the aforementioned assumption could be replaced by the assumptions
needed for a Central Limit Theorem for independent draws to hold (e.g.: Hayashi - 2000).
However, Proposition 2 allows for greater generality and encompasses, for example, the case of
correlated draws that satisfy Gordin￿ s conditions (see again Hayashi - 2000).
3.2 Testing for equal riskiness
In this subsection we discuss a test of the hypothesis that two gambles are equally risky.
4Existence and uniqueness of a ￿nite and strictly positive solution of the sample moment condition (7) is a
trivial consequence of the fact that the population moment condition (3) has a unique ￿nite and strictly positive
solution for any gamble (Aumann and Serrano - 2008, Theorem A; see also Section 2 above): the empirical
distribution de￿ned by the T draws fgtgt=1;:::;T is a gamble if it has positive expectation and negative values
with positive probability; as a consequence, if these two technical conditions are satis￿ed, Aumann and Serrano￿ s
theorem readily applies also to the empirical distribution.
10To conduct tests of equal riskiness, it is necessary to jointly estimate the indices of riskiness
of two di⁄erent gambles. Extending the results of the previous subsection to the case of joint
GMM estimation of two indices is trivial, but the notation becomes cumbersome. Therefore, we
just discuss the main features of joint estimation, without going into all the technical details.
Once joint estimation is carried out, several asymptotically equivalent tests of the null of equal
riskiness can be constructed. Here, we brie￿ y present a t-test.
Let fgtgt=1;:::;T and fhtgt=1;:::;T be two jointly ergodic and stationary sequences of draws
from the joint distribution of gambles g and h. Let Rg and Rh be their respective indices of
riskiness, satisfying the two population moment conditions:
E[m(gt;Rg)] = 0 (10)
E[m(ht;Rh)] = 0 (11)
where m(g;r) is de￿ned as in (4).
GMM estimators c Rg of Rg and c Rh of Rh are de￿ned by:
h





2 + [Qh;T (rh)]
2 (12)













The two sample moments Qg;T (rg) and Qh;T (rh) in (12) could be given di⁄erent weights or,
more generally, could be used to construct a quadratic form with a positive de￿nite weighting
matrix. We focus here on the special case of an identity weighting matrix to keep the notation
simple. Furthermore, in all empirical applications presented below the choice of the weighting









were always satis￿ed exactly.
The hypothesis that the two gambles are equally risky can be tested by running a simple
t-test of the null hypothesis that Rg ￿Rh = 0. Under the null, c Rg ￿ c Rh is asymptotically normal
with mean zero and asymptotic variance:
AVar
￿












c Rg; c Rh
￿
(15)
where AVar denotes asymptotic variance and ACov asymptotic covariance. The usual asymptotic
theory (see Proposition 6 in the Appendix) can be used to compute a consistent estimator
[ AVar
￿








c Rg ￿ c Rh r
[ AVar
￿
c Rg ￿ c Rh
￿ (16)
If the value of the t-statistic lies outside a pre-speci￿ed con￿dence interval, then the null hypoth-
esis of equal riskiness is rejected.
113.3 Estimating conditional riskiness
There is ample empirical evidence that means, variances and higher order moments of asset
returns are time-varying and predictable (for a survey, see A￿t Sahalia and Brandt - 2001). It
is then natural to ask how this predictable time-variation a⁄ects the index of riskiness of an
asset. In this subsection (and in subsection 4.3) we develop a statistical framework that allows
to answer this question.
As in most empirical ￿nance studies, we assume that, at each period, the econometrician
observes the realization of a vector of predictor variables Xt (let it be an N ￿ 1 vector), before
observing the realization of the asset return gt. Time-variation in the conditional distribution of
asset returns is driven by time-variation in Xt. More precisely, by conditioning on the information
provided by Xt, one obtains the conditional distribution of gt at time t. For each realization
of Xt, gt has a di⁄erent conditional distribution, which depends on Xt and is characterized by
its own index of riskiness. Denote this conditional index of riskiness by R(Xt). The functional
dependence of R on Xt is in general unknown and depends on the joint distribution of gt and















We propose a parametric approach to estimation of R(Xt). We assume that there exist a
K ￿ 1 (K ￿ N) vector of parameters ￿ and a known function ￿ (Xt;b) of Xt and b (b 2 RK),
such that:
R(Xt) = ￿ (Xt;￿) (18)
￿ is the parameter to be estimated.
By trivial properties of the conditional expectation operator and by the law of iterated ex-
pectations, we can obtain N moment conditions:













The above moment conditions can be used to derive a GMM estimator of ￿, as illustrated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Consistency - Conditional riskiness) Let fwtgt=1;:::;T be the ￿rst T ele-
ments of an ergodic and stationary sequence of draws from the joint distribution of the (N + 1)-
dimensional random vector w = [g X|]
|, having bounded support. Let ￿ (Xt;b) be a scalar
function ￿ : RN ￿ RK ! R++, continuous in Xt and b and such that R(Xt) = ￿ (Xt;￿). Let
u be any positive number strictly larger than k￿k1, the L1-norm of ￿. Assume that b1;b2 2 RK
and b1 6= b2 imply P(￿ (Xt;b1) 6= ￿ (Xt;b2)) > 0. Let b ￿ be the GMM estimator de￿ned by:


















and c W a N ￿ N symmetric matrix that converges in probability to a symmetric and positive
de￿nite matrix W as T tends to in￿nity. Then b ￿ is a well-de￿ned random variable and it
converges in probability to ￿ as T tends to in￿nity.
12As in the unconditional case, the proposition assumes that the parameter space is bounded
(b 2 [￿u;u]
K). This is necessary because the equation E[m(gt;Xt;b)] = 0 may have multiple
solutions in RK (the compacti￿cation of RK): in fact, the equation is solved by any b such that
8Xt; ￿ (Xt;b) = 1 5. Again, this is not restrictive, because u can be set equal to any arbitrar-
ily large positive number such that [￿u;u]
K certainly includes ￿ according to the researcher￿ s
judgement. The technical conditions imposed on the function ￿ (Xt;b) are quite mild. In the
next section we will propose a speci￿cation of ￿ that satis￿es all such conditions.
The following proposition gives a set of su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic normality of
the estimator b ￿.
Proposition 4 (Normality - Conditional riskiness) Let all the conditions of Proposition 3
be satis￿ed. Let ￿ (Xt;b) be continuously di⁄erentiable in b for any Xt. Suppose that, as T tends
to in￿nity, 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;Xt;￿) converges in distribution to a multivariate normal distribution










b ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
converges in distribution to a multivariate normal distribution with mean










Furthermore, if there exists a matrix b S converging in probability to S as T tends to in￿nity,
then the matrix b V de￿ned by:
b V =
￿
b D>c W b D
￿￿1 ￿
b D>c W b Sc W b D
￿￿













converges in probability to V .
As in the unconditional case, the assumption that 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;Xt;￿) converges in dis-
tribution to a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and full-rank covariance matrix
S could be replaced by sets of more primitive assumptions. However, such assumption is very
general and allows to tackle the case of correlated draws from the joint distribution of gt and Xt.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 The data
We use data on a set of popular indices of US corporate bonds constructed by Merril Lynch
and available on Bloomberg. The dataset includes a general index, comprising investment grade
bonds of all maturities and ratings, and four sub-indices that group bonds belonging to di⁄erent
rating classes: AAA, AA, A and BBB6. For each index, we have two daily time series: total
daily return on the index and average yield-to-maturity of the bonds belonging to the index.
The series start on December 31st, 1988 and end on January 30th, 2009, the day when we last
updated our dataset.
5For example, if Xt > 0, it su¢ ces to set one component of b equal to 1.
6Merril Lynch identi￿es the indices by the following codes: C0A0 (general index), C0A1 (AAA), C0A2 (AA),
C0A3 (A), C0A4 (BBB).
13An accurate description of index rules and de￿nitions is reported on Merril Lynch￿ s website
www.mlindex.ml.com. We report here the main features of the indices. The general index (Merrill
Lynch US Corporate Index) comprises all US dollar denominated corporate bonds publicly issued
in the US domestic market that have an investment grade rating (based on an average of Moody￿ s,
S&P and Fitch), at least one year remaining term to ￿nal maturity, a ￿xed coupon schedule and a
minimum amount outstanding of $250 million (as of today). Index constituents are capitalization-
weighted based on their current amount outstanding. Intra-month cash ￿ ows are reinvested daily,
at the beginning-of-month 1-month Libid rate, until the last calendar day of the month, when
the index is rebalanced. A sub-index for a speci￿c rating class includes all the securities included
in the general index and belonging to that rating class.
Other popular indices of US corporate bonds are those constructed by Barclays and by Citi-
group: these indices are available at a daily frequency only for shorter time spans; furthermore,
we were not able to ￿nd sub-indices of these indices for all the aforementioned rating classes.
While the rules and de￿nitions of these indices are slightly di⁄erent from those of the Merril
Lynch indices, their daily returns are highly correlated with the returns on Merril Lynch indices
(the correlation coe¢ cients for the general indices are higher than 90 per cent). We limit our
analysis to the Merril Lynch indices because they are available for a longer time span and because
their construction rules make them highly representative of the universe of liquid US corporate
bonds.
In our empirical analysis we also use a Merril Lynch Index of US government bonds (Merrill
Lynch US Treasury Index7), which tracks the performance of US dollar denominated sovereign
debt publicly issued by the US government in its domestic market. The index includes securities
that have at least one year remaining term to ￿nal maturity, a ￿xed coupon schedule and a
minimum amount outstanding of $1 billion (as of today). Bills, in￿ ation-linked debt and strips
are excluded from the index.
To predict the riskiness of bond returns we use a number of macroeconomic and ￿nancial
variables. The macroeconomic variables are a subset of the ￿ key country indicators￿collected
by Datastream for the US: industrial production, the consumer price index, money supply, the
unemployment rate and initial jobless claims. The ￿nancial data series are: the 3-month US-
dollar LIBOR rate, the constant-maturity yields on 3-month and 10-year US Treasuries and the
S&P 500 total return index. In subsection 4.4 we explain in more detail how these data series
are used to obtain predictors of riskiness.
4.2 Preliminary analysis8
In this subsection, we present some descriptive statistics about the bond return indices and we
provide comments about the estimates of the unconditional indices of riskiness (Table 1).
The sample mean and standard deviation of daily returns are very similar across rating classes.
The empirical distribution of returns exhibits strong departures from normality, as indicated by
large negative values of the skewness and values of the kurtosis much larger than three. The
Jarque-Bera statistic rejects the hypothesis of normality at all conventional levels of con￿dence
for all rating classes. The estimate of the unconditional index of riskiness ranges between 1.5
and 1.9 depending on the class of rating. Riskiness does not increase monotonically when the
rating class is decreased. The estimated ordering is as follows:
Gov < AAA < AA < BBB < A < SP500 (25)
7Merril Lynch identi￿es the index by the code G0Q0.
8To streamline the discussion of our empirical analysis, we gather all technical details about standard errors,
long-run covariance matrices and multi-step estimation in subsection 4.6.
14where A < B indicates that A is less risky than B, Gov denotes government bonds and SP500
the Standard & Poor￿ s 500 stock index. Running two-sided pair-wise tests of equal riskiness at
95 per cent con￿dence (see section 2), we do not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between
the riskiness of di⁄erent rating classes, except for the A class, which is signi￿cantly riskier than
than the AA and AAA classes (see Table 2). We also test the hypothesis that corporate bonds
and government bonds are equally risky and we are able to reject the hypothesis at 95 per cent
con￿dence only for the A class. To assess how departures from normality a⁄ect the riskiness of
corporate bonds, we calculate the index of riskiness for normal distributions having the same
mean and variance as the sample distributions of returns (see the last line of Table 1). This
is easily done by exploiting the fact that the riskiness of a normal gamble is equal to half its
variance divided by its mean (Aumann and Serrano - 2008). We ￿nd that for each rating class
the actual riskiness is higher than the riskiness of its theoretical normal counterpart. However,
such di⁄erences are not statistically signi￿cant.
4.3 Speci￿cation of the functional form of R(Xt)
As explained in Section 3, the functional dependence of R on the vector of predetermined variables
Xt is in general unknown and depends on the joint distribution of gt and Xt. Taking a parametric
approach to the estimation of R(Xt), we assume that R(Xt) is a known function ￿ of Xt and of
a vector of parameters ￿ to be estimated:
R(Xt) = ￿ (Xt;￿) (26)





￿i log(hi (Xit)) (27)
where hi are continuous functions hi : R ! R such that hi (Xi;t) 2 R++;8t. Note that log(R) is
well-de￿ned since R is strictly positive. Hence:







In the subsequent analysis, we will always assume X1t ￿ 1 and h1 (X1t) = exp(X1t), so that
the log-log equation will always include a constant on its right-hand side.
Note that ￿ (Xt;￿) meets the requirements of strict positivity, continuity and continuous
di⁄erentiability set forth by proposition 3 and 4.
The above functional form can be motivated as follows. Suppose gt is conditionally normal
with conditional mean ￿t and conditional variance ￿2
t. It is possible to prove that the index of
riskiness of a normally distributed gamble is half its variance divided by its mean. If you de￿ne
X2t = ￿t and X3t = ￿t, then:
￿ (Xt;￿) = exp(log(0:5)log(h1 (X1t)) + 2log(h2 (X2t)) ￿ log(h3 (X3t))) (29)
where h2 and h3 are identity functions. Hence, the functional form (28) is correctly speci￿ed when
the gamble gt is conditionally normal and the vector of predictors Xt contains the conditional
mean and the conditional variance of gt. Provided the functions hi () are chosen appropriately,
(28) is also correctly speci￿ed when linear combinations of functions of the predictor variables
in Xt are unbiased predictors of the conditional mean and variance.
15In the Appendix we show that, outside the important case of conditional normality, (28) is
still general enough to approximate any su¢ ciently smooth functional form for R(Xt) to any
desired degree of accuracy, provided one (eventually) replaces the set of predictors Xt with a
larger set containing also non-linear functions of the components of Xt.
4.4 Conditioning on a single predetermined variable9
A great deal of the empirical ￿nance literature is concerned with identifying the economic and
￿nancial variables that best predict time-variation in the distribution of asset returns. As a
consequence, an ever-growing set of economic and ￿nancial variables has been shown to partly
predict the moments of assets returns (for a thorough review see, again, A￿t Sahalia and Brandt
- 2001). In this subsection we consider a fairly large set of predictor variables, including both the
variables that are frequently utilized in the aforementioned literature and other variables that
are speci￿c to the corporate bond indices utilized in this study (namely, the average yield-to-
maturity and the EWMA volatility of corporate bond returns - see below for more details). We
￿rst list these variables and we then discuss the estimates of all the univariate models obtained by
considering in turn each variable alone. Whenever we ￿nd statistically signi￿cant evidence that a
variable can predict the time-variation in riskiness, we try to give possible economic explanations
for this predictability.
Using the notation previously introduced, we consider the case in which Xt is 2-dimensional:
X1t is constant and X2t is the predetermined variable of interest. If X2t > 0 the function h2 ()
is the identity function, otherwise h2 () is chosen so as to ensure that h2 (X2t) > 0 (see below).
h2 () is chosen to be the identity function for the following data series, which are strictly
positive:
￿ the unemployment rate (UN);
￿ the initial jobless claims (IJC);
￿ the 3-month US-dollar LIBOR rate (LIB3M);
￿ the constant-maturity yield on 3-month US Treasuries (TRS3M);
￿ the constant-maturity yield on 10-year US Treasuries (TRS10Y);
￿ the average yield-to-maturity of the bonds belonging to the corporate bond index under
analysis (YTM);
￿ the TED-spread (TED), de￿ned as the di⁄erence between LIB3M and TRS3M, a widely
used measure of funding liquidity;
￿ an adaptive forecast of the conditional volatility of corporate bond returns (VOL), com-
puted using RiskMetrics EWMA methodology10;
9See footnote 8.
10Riskmetrics EWMA (RiskMetrics 1996) is an adaptive estimate of conditional volatility. The conditional
variance of returns at time t (denote it by ￿2
t) is recuresively computed as:
￿2
t = 0:94 ￿ ￿2
t￿1 + 0:06 ￿ r2
t￿1
where rt￿1 is the return observed at time t￿1. When rt has zero mean, the above is equivalent to an IGARCH(1,1)
speci￿cation for conditional volatility. Setting the decay factor equal to 0:94 is in theory suboptimal with respect
to estimating the parameter for each time series. However, such choice has proved to provide excellent out-of-
sample performance for a broad range of daily ￿nancial time series. Furthermore, estimates of the parameter are
known to be quite sensitive to the choice of the statistical loss function used for estimation (GonzÆlez-Rivera et
al. - 2007).
16￿ an adaptive forecast of the conditional volatility of S&P 500 returns (SPVOL), also com-






for the following data series, which are not strictly positive:
￿ in￿ ation (CPI), computed as the 12-month growth rate of the Consumer Price Index;
￿ growth in industrial production (IP), computed as the 12-month growth rate of the seasonally-
adjusted volume of industrial production;
￿ money growth (M1), computed as the 12-month growth rate of M1;
￿ the stock market trend (SPTREND), computed as the percentage appreciation of the S&P
500 index over the previous 12 months;
￿ the slope of the US Treasury yield curve (SLOPE), computed as the constant-maturity yield
on 10-year US Treasuries minus the constant-maturity yield on 3-month US Treasuries.
The transformation (30) converts growth rates into growth factors and ensures strict positivity
of all transformed data series, since for all series considered above X2t > ￿100. Data series whose
frequency is lower than daily are transformed to daily series by repeating a ￿gure after its release
date on every date preceding the following release.
Table 3 reports the estimates of ￿2 for each of the above predictors. According to these esti-
mates, YTM, LIB3M, TRS3M, TRS10Y and VOL are highly signi￿cant predictors of riskiness,
individually, both for the broad index and for all the sub-indices of bonds.
The higher the average yield to maturity (YTM), the lower predicted riskiness is. We believe
that this result deserves some discussion. Note, ￿rst, that the total return of a portfolio of
bonds is the sum of two components: accrued interests and capital gains (losses). A higher
YTM mechanically increases the former, while it has no obvious a priori e⁄ect on the latter:
for example, if YTM has a mean-reverting behavior, a high YTM could anticipate future capital
gains; on the other hand, if a high YTM re￿ ects higher default rates, a high YTM could anticipate
future capital losses. Hence, it is not clear whether to expect a higher YTM to increase or decrease
future expected returns. However, regressing our sample of daily corporate bond returns on YTM,
we ￿nd a positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on YTM (the p-value is 0.002 for the
general index). Furthermore, when YTM is low, losses are more frequent and on average larger
(see Figure 2). In the previous section (see equation (29)), we have shown that, for normally
distributed gambles, a ceteris paribus increase in expected returns decreases the riskiness of an
asset. In our case, a higher YTM increases expected returns, but the ￿nal e⁄ect on riskiness
is not, in principle, obvious, since YTM could a⁄ect other characteristics of the conditional
distribution of bond returns and the distribution itself is not normal. However, in our sample,
we ￿nd that a higher YTM indeed decreases the riskiness of bonds, con￿rming the intuition
developed for normally distributed returns. Discussing the properties of Aumann and Serrano￿ s
(2008) economic index of riskiness, we have highlighted one important merit of it with respect
to more traditional measures of risk such as variance: the economic index of riskiness takes into
account the fact that expected return is an important component of risk; if, ceteris paribus,
you increase the expected return of an asset, its risk must diminish, because you are decreasing
the probability of facing low-payo⁄ states. Roughly speaking, our empirical ￿ndings suggest
that a higher YTM decreases the probability of disappointing returns on corporate bonds, hence
17diminishing their riskiness. In the next subsection, we will show that this ￿nding is robust to
a number of controls: estimating a battery of multivariate models, we ￿nd that the relation
between YTM and riskiness does not change sign and remains statistically signi￿cant also when
we consider other predictors simultaneously.
Also LIB3M, TRS3M and TRS10Y, if considered individually, are signi￿cantly and negatively
associated with riskiness. Since these variables all provide a measure of the level of prevailing
interest rates, this empirical ￿nding seems to suggest that corporate bonds tend to be riskier in
a low-interest rate environment. However, these variables are highly correlated with YTM (the
correlation coe¢ cient is higher than 70 per cent for all rating classes and all the three variables).
As a consequence, their negative association with riskiness in uni-variate models might simply
be due to the fact that they are a proxy for YTM and hence for expected returns. In fact, in
the next section we will show that, once you control for YTM, the relation can change sign or
become statistically insigni￿cant.
VOL, the EWMA estimate of the conditional volatility of bond returns, is signi￿cantly and
positively associated with riskiness. EWMA estimates of conditional volatility are widely uti-
lized in ￿nancial econometrics (e.g.: GonzÆlez-Rivera et al. - 2007), thanks to their ability to
capture persistent shifts in the conditional volatility of asset returns (Engle - 1982 and Boller-
slev - 1986). In the previous section (see equation (29)), we have shown that the conditional
volatility of normally distributed returns is positively associated with riskiness in a bivariate
model where conditional volatility and conditional expected return are the two predetermined
variables. Hence, if VOL correctly predicts conditional volatility, it is reasonable to conjecture11
that an increase in VOL increases riskiness. Our empirical ￿ndings con￿rm the intuition.
TED, SPTREND, SPVOL and IP are signi￿cantly associated to riskiness for some, but not
all classes of rating. Inspecting Table 3, it is possible to observe a general pattern whereby these
variables have a greater impact on lower rated bonds.
TED is a widely used measure of funding liquidity (e.g.: Brunnermeier - 2009), the ease
with which corporations can ￿nd sources of ￿nancing for their activity. A higher TED predicts
an increase in the riskiness of corporate bonds: a tentative explanation is that, when funding
liquidity is scarce (TED is high), corporations may face di¢ culties in re￿nancing their debt and
therefore their liabilities may become riskier to hold. More ￿nancially constrained ￿rms are
arguably those more a⁄ected by a lack of funding liquidity: this might explain why the e⁄ect of
an increase in TED is higher for lower rated bonds.
A decline in stock prices over the last 12 months (a decline in SPTREND) predicts an increase
in the riskiness of lower-rated bonds. A decline in stock prices may proxy for a decline in the
value of corporate assets which decreases the probability that ￿rms be solvent.
Also a rise in the volatility of stock prices (SPVOL) predicts an increase in the riskiness
of lower-rated bonds. A rise in SPVOL may re￿ ect an increase in the volatility of corporate
assets: as highlighted by popular theoretical frameworks (e.g.: Merton - 1974), this may in turn
increase the probability of corporate defaults. Empirically, this has also resulted in a signi￿cant
correlation between equity volatility and corporate bond yields (Campbell and Taksler - 2003).
Another predictor of heightened riskiness is a decline in industrial production over the last
12 months (a decline in IP). IP is a widely used coincident indicator of the business cycle (e.g.:
Pericoli and Taboga - 2008). In phases of economic contraction, ￿rms are likely to be less
pro￿table and their probability of default increases.
11Of course, an increase in VOL could also predict an increase in expected returns, dampening the positive
association with riskiness; furthermore, departures from normality could make the relation more complex.
184.5 Conditioning on multiple predetermined variables12
While it is commonplace in the empirical ￿nance literature to consider only one predictor at a
time (as in the previous section), it is desirable to combine the predictive power of individual
variables into multivariate models that are able to summarize in a parsimonious manner most of
the information that can usefully be exploited to form conditional distributions of asset returns.
Hence, in this subsection we discuss models having more than one predictor of riskiness and we
propose a method to select the variables to include in a multivariate model of riskiness. We
present only a limited selection of tables obtained from our multivariate analysis and collect all
others in a not-to-be-published appendix (NPA) available upon request from the authors. Every
time we refer to a table that is not published, this is indicated in parentheses as (NPA).
Estimating multivariate models, we have encountered statistical problems similar to those
found in the literature on the predictability of stock and bond returns (see e.g. A￿t Sahalia and
Brandt - 2001 for a discussion): while several variables individually predict riskiness, it is hard to
build statistically sound multivariate models with more than few predictors. The main problem
is the fairly high collinearity between predictors (the condition number of the design matrix
rises steeply by adding more variables): this is re￿ ected in high standard errors of parameter
estimates for richer models. For this reason, and also in consideration of the computational
complexities that arise in a non-linear GMM setting, we favour a speci￿c-to-general approach
to model selection. We start with a detailed description of the methodology adopted and the
results obtained in the case of the general corporate bond index. We then brie￿ y comment the
results obtained for the sub-indices, highlighting the main di⁄erences with respect to the general
index.
Our analysis of the general index starts from a bivariate model where YTM and VOL are the
two included predictors. We start with these two variables because they are the only two in the
dataset to provide index-speci￿c information about corporate bonds. The estimated coe¢ cients
of both variables (Table 4) are highly signi￿cant and have the same sign found with uni-variate
models: a high YTM decreases riskiness, while a high VOL increases it.
Adding the remaining variables in our dataset one at a time to form three-variable models,
we ￿nd statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients (with p-values lower than 10 per cent) only for LIB3M,
SLOPE, CPI and TED (NPA). Adding a third variable, VOL always remains highly signi￿cant
and YTM remains signi￿cant in all but two cases (SLOPE and TRS10Y). The latter result
might be due to the fact that SLOPE and TRS10Y contain information about long-term rates
also contained in YTM.
If we add a fourth variable to the three-variable models thus obtained (YTM and VOL, plus
one of LIB3M, SLOPE, CPI and TED, plus one of the remaining variables), we never ￿nd a
statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient for the fourth variable (Table 4 and NPA). In all the four-
variable models we estimate, the signs of YTM and VOL remain the same and in most cases
the two variables remain statistically signi￿cant (NPA): hence, the ￿nding that a high YTM
decreases riskiness, while a high VOL increases it, seems fairly robust.
Since in no case we are able to reject the restriction that the coe¢ cient of the fourth variable
is zero, we limit our attention to the four three-variable models (YTM and VOL, plus one
of LIB3M, SLOPE, CPI and TED). To select a model out of these four models, we utilize a
consistent selection criterion suggested by Andrews and Lu (2001). Consider, for concreteness,
the three-variable model including LIB3M as a predictor. We add over-identifying restrictions
by imposing orthogonality also to the three variables included in the other models (SLOPE, CPI
and TED) and we compute the J-statistic for testing such over-identifying restrictions (Table 5).
We repeat this procedure for all the four models. The best among the three-variable models is
12See footnote 8.
19selected according to a ranking based on the J-statistic. In our case, a BIC-type criterion or an
Hannan-Quinn-type criterion assign the same ranking assigned by the J-statistics13, because the
number of over-identifying restrictions is the same for all four models. The model selected by the
criterion (the one having the lowest J-statistic) is the one including CPI as the third variable.
In this model, as well as in all the four-variable models we have estimated, an increase in CPI
increases riskiness.
A number of other papers found that in￿ ation can a⁄ect corporate bond returns through
various channels. Gordon (1982) argued that higher in￿ ation can lead to both higher leverage
and higher bankruptcy rates, because it increases the tax advantage of issuing debt rather than
equity. Wadhwani (1986) found that high in￿ ation increases bankruptcy rates because it raises
interest payments more than corporate pro￿ts. Valckx (2004) found empirical con￿rmation that
when in￿ ation is higher than expected, excess bond returns are lower than expected.
Figure 1 displays the conditional riskiness of the general corporate bond index, estimated with
the model selected by Andrews and Lu (2001)￿ s criterion. According to such estimates, after the
year 2000, the riskiness of corporate bonds has been on average much higher than during the
previous decade. As volatility has not been dissimilar in the two periods and in￿ ation has on
average been lower in the most recent decade, higher predicted riskiness in recent years is mainly
accounted for by low corporate bond yields.
We take the same steps described above to build multivariate models for the sub-indices.
Again, we start from a bivariate model where YTM and VOL are the two included predictors.
Adding a third variable, we ￿nd that: 1) no added variable has a statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient
for the AAA index; 2) only CPI is signi￿cant for the AA index; 3) CPI, LIB3M, SLOPE, TED and
UN are signi￿cant for the A and BBB index; 4) also IJC and M1 are signi￿cant for the BBB index.
These ￿ndings are consistent with the pattern found with uni-variate models: the riskiness of
lower-rated bonds seems to be more responsive to general macroeconomic and ￿nancial conditions
than the riskiness of higher-rated bonds.
The same model selection procedure adopted for the general index leads to the following
selection of predictor variables for the sub-indices (Tables 5 and 6): YTM and VOL for the AAA
index; YTM, VOL and CPI for both the AA and the A index; YTM, VOL and UN for the
BBB index. Hence, after controlling for YTM and VOL, no other variables in our dataset have
signi￿cant predictive power for the riskiness of AAA bonds, while the riskiness of AA and A
bonds is satisfactorily captured by the same variables selected to model the general index. The
best model for the BBB index, instead, includes UN in place of CPI: a rise in unemployment
decreases riskiness. The work of Boyd et al. (2005) can help to explain this ￿nding: during
economic expansions, which are by far more frequent than recessions, a rise in unemployment is
good news for corporations, because it anticipates higher pro￿ts and lower in￿ ation and interest
rates. Hence, according to this interpretation, it is not surprising that UN appears in place of
CPI in a model, because the two variables measure interrelated phenomena.
4.6 Standard errors, autocorrelations and other technical details
In this subsection we gather some technical details of estimation that were not discussed in the
previous subsections.
First of all, let us address estimation of the long-run covariance matrix S, i.e. the asymptotic
covariance matrix of the sums 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;R) and 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;Xt;￿). One possible source





13Note, however, that the two-variable model including only YTM and VOL is preferred by the BIC statistics
to all the three-variable models (Table 5). On the other hand, according to the Hannan-Quinn statistic the best





. If the sequence is serially uncorrelated, then the sample variance of mt is
a consistent estimator of S. Otherwise, one needs to use estimators, such as Newey-West, that
take serial correlation into account. Running various portmanteau tests for serial correlation on
mt, in virtually all cases we were not able to reject the null of serial uncorrelatedness14. Hence
we chose to estimate S with the sample variance of mt.
Conditional heteroskedasticity is of course found in many time series in our dataset, but it is
not a concern, because the estimators proposed in Propositions 1 to 4 are already heteroskedasticity-
consistent.
The choice of the weighting matrix c W was irrelevant for all just-identi￿ed models (N = K),
because all the sample moment conditions were always satis￿ed exactly. For over-identi￿ed
models (N > K), we adopted a multi-step e¢ cient procedure. We started with c W = I, obtained
an estimate b S of S, and utilized b S￿1 as the new weighting matrix. We iterated this procedure
10 times.
5 Directions for further research
We believe Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) contribution has opened several new avenues for future
research in empirical ￿nance.
First of all, the analysis of riskiness we have proposed for corporate bonds could be replicated
for other asset classes, such as stocks, government bonds, currencies and commodities.
Second, within our parametric framework, we have chosen to work with GMM estimators, but
other estimators could have been used, such as KLIC (Kitamura and Stutzer - 1997 and Imbens
et al. - 1998). Gregory et al. (2002) have shown simulation evidence that KLIC estimators have
desirable small-sample properties when used to estimate preference parameters; since the index
of riskiness is closely related to preferences, it might be worthwhile to replicate a simulation
exercise similar to theirs for the indices of riskiness.
Third, we have chosen a parametric approach to estimating the conditional dependence of
the index of riskiness on a set of predetermined variables, but also a non-parametric approach
could be undertaken along the following lines: the joint distribution of the returns and the
predictor variables could be estimated non-parametrically with a multivariate density estimator
(e.g.: Silverman - 1986); then, one could calculate the index of riskiness using the estimated
density as if it were the population density, using the population moment condition (17). We
have not chosen this approach because it would be much less straightforward to do inference with
this two-stage procedure; furthermore, the curse of dimensionality would be even more severe.
However, after developing appropriate inferential procedures, a non-parametric approach could
be desirable in low-dimensional settings or with larger datasets, because it would be less prone
to incur into mis-speci￿cation problems.
Finally, performing model selection in the multivariate conditional case is not a trivial task.
We have utilized the consistent selection criterion suggested by Andrews and Lu (2001). However,
such criterion does not permit comparisons between just-identi￿ed models. Furthermore, to our
knowledge, there are no other selection criteria that can be readily applied to our estimation
framework. Model selection in a general GMM setting is still an open area of research: de￿ning
selection criteria to be utilized in the selection of multivariate models of riskiness could be an
interesting avenue to explore.
14The sequences fgtg, being sequences of asset returns, are, not surprisingly, serially uncorrelated. More




is serially uncorrelated, despite many instances of high
serial correlation in Xt. Intuitively, this is explained by the fact that the sign of gt determines whether mt is
above or below its mean, while Xt determines only the magnitude of deviations from the mean.
216 Conclusions
Aumann and Serrano (2008) have laid the foundations of a theory of risk measurement that is
deeply rooted in decision theory. The index of riskiness they proposed has a straightforward
economic interpretation: when the index of riskiness of an asset increases, then some risk-averse
agents that were previously willing to hold the asset are no longer willing to hold it. This squares
exactly with the idea that risk is what risk-averse agents avert.
This paper has dealt with statistical estimation of Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) index of
riskiness. We have proposed a GMM method to estimate the index and a conditional setting
that allows to deal with time-variation in the index of riskiness. We have utilized these tools to
study the riskiness of corporate bonds.
The statement that "corporate bonds are riskier than government bonds" appears to be com-
mon wisdom. However, despite using a long time series of corporate bond returns, we have
not been able to reject the hypothesis that corporate bonds and government bonds are equally
risky, at least for some rating classes. We have found that a number of ￿nancial and macroeco-
nomic variables help to predict changes in the riskiness of corporate bonds. Adaptive forecasts
of volatility, widely used to measure ￿nancial risk, are not alone su¢ cient to capture all the
time-variation in riskiness. Other variables, considered together with volatility, are statistically
signi￿cant predictors of riskiness. For example, a high yield-to-maturity tends to reduce riskiness.
In our sample, a high yield-to-maturity predicts high positive returns and a reduced probability
of facing low-payo⁄ states, hence lowering riskiness. According to our estimates, after the year
2000, low yields have contributed to make the riskiness of corporate bonds on average much
higher than during the previous decade.
Overall, bringing Aumann and Serrano￿ s (2008) theory of risk measurement to the data is
relatively straightforward and allows to gain new insights into the riskiness of ￿nancial assets.
There seems to be much room for further empirical applications of their theory.
227 Appendix
7.1 Proofs of consistency and asymptotic normality
Our proofs of consistency and asymptotic normality are based on the following propositions,
adapted from Hayashi (2000 - Proposition 7.7, p. 467, and Proposition 7.10, p. 480):
Proposition 5 (Consistency - general case) Let fwtgt=1;:::;T be the ￿rst T elements of an
ergodic and stationary sequence of draws from the distribution of a d-dimensional random vector
w. Let ￿ be a subset of Rp. Let ￿0 2 ￿. Let m(w;￿) be a k ￿ 1 vector-valued function
m : Rd ￿ Rp ! Rk. Let b ￿ be the GMM estimator de￿ned by:


















and c W a k￿k symmetric matrix that converges in probability to a symmetric and positive de￿nite
matrix W as T tends to in￿nity. Suppose that:
1. E[m(wt;￿0)] = 0;
2. E[m(wt;￿)] 6= 0 for all ￿ 6= ￿0 in ￿;
3. ￿ is compact;
4. m(wt;￿) is continuous in ￿ for all wt;
5. m(wt;￿) is measurable in wt for all ￿ in ￿;
6. E[sup￿2￿ km(wt;￿)k] < 1.
Then b ￿ is a well-de￿ned random variable and it converges in probability to ￿0 as T tends to
in￿nity.
Proposition 6 (Normality - general case) Let all the conditions of Proposition 5 be satis-
￿ed. Suppose also that:
1. ￿0 is in the interior of ￿;
2. m(wt;￿) is continuously di⁄erentiable in ￿ for any wt, with k ￿ p derivative
@m(wt;￿)
@￿| ;
3. as T tends to in￿nity, 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(wt;￿0) converges in distribution to a multivariate nor-
mal distribution with mean zero and full-rank covariance matrix S;


























b ￿ ￿ ￿0
￿
converges in distribution to a multivariate normal distribution with mean










Furthermore, if there exists a matrix b S converging in probability to S as T tends to in￿nity,
then the matrix b V de￿ned by:
b V =
￿
b D>c W b D
￿￿1 ￿
b D>c W b Sc W b D
￿￿














converges in probability to V .
Thanks to the above results, we can prove the four propositions found in the main text of
the paper:
Proof of Proposition 1. We have to prove that the conditions in Proposition 5 are satis￿ed
when the conditions in Proposition 1 are met. First of all, let us establish correspondences
between the notation in the two propositions: wt = gt; ￿ = [l;u]; ￿0 = R; c W = 1. Condition 1
in Proposition 5 is satis￿ed by the very de￿nition of the index of riskiness (which exists because
E[g] > 0 and P[g < 0] > 0). Since there is a unique strictly positive index of riskiness, by
Theorem A in Aumann and Serrano (2008), also Condition 2 is satis￿ed. [l;u] is compact, hence
Condition 3 is satis￿ed. m(gt;r) is discontinuous in r on R+ only at 0, but 0 is not included
in [l;u], hence Condition 4 is satis￿ed. m(gt;r) is continuous in gt on all R, hence it is also
measurable (Condition 5). gt has bounded support, [l;u] is compact and m(gt;r) is continuous
in gt and in r, so m(gt;r) is bounded and Condition 6 trivially holds. Therefore, all conditions
are satis￿ed and b R is a consistent estimator of R.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have to prove that the conditions in Proposition 6 are satis￿ed
when the conditions in Proposition 2 are met. Correspondences between the notation in the two
propositions are as in the previous proof: wt = gt; ￿ = [l;u]; ￿0 = R; c W = 1. Condition 1
in Proposition 6 is satis￿ed by the fact that l < R < u. m(gt;r) is non-di⁄erentiable in r on
R+ only at 0, but 0 is not included in [l;u]; furthermore, it is continuously di⁄erentiable, hence
Condition 2 is satis￿ed. Condition 3 is satis￿ed by requiring that 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;R) converges in
distribution to a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and strictly positive variance
S. Since m(gt;r) is continuously di⁄erentiable in r on the compact [l;u] and gt is bounded,
Condition 4 is trivially satis￿ed. Condition 5 is satis￿ed by the requirement that D 6= 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have to prove that the conditions in Proposition 5 are satis￿ed
when the conditions in Proposition 3 are met. First of all, let us establish correspondences





K; ￿0 = ￿. Condition 1 in Proposition 5 is satis￿ed by the assumption that R(Xt) =
￿ (Xt;￿). By the assumption that P(￿ (Xt;b1) 6= ￿ (Xt;b2)) > 0 if b1;b2 2 RK and b1 6= b2,
P(￿ (Xt;b) 6= R(Xt)) > 0 for all b 6= ￿ in ￿. Hence, by uniqueness of the index of riskiness,
E[m(wt;b)] 6= 0 for all b 6= ￿ in ￿ and Condition 2 is satis￿ed. [￿u;u]
K is compact, hence










is at ￿ = 0
and ￿ (Xt;b) is strictly positive and continuous in b, m(gt;Xt;b) is continuous in b, so Condition
4 is satis￿ed. By the same token, the fact that ￿ (Xt;b) is strictly positive and continuous in Xt




(Condition 5). wt has bounded support, [￿u;u]
K is compact and m(gt;Xt;b) is continuous in
gt, Xt and b, so m(gt;Xt;b) is bounded and Condition 6 trivially holds. Therefore, all conditions
are satis￿ed and b ￿ is a consistent estimator of ￿.
Proof of Proposition 4. We have to prove that the conditions in Proposition 6 are satis￿ed
when the conditions in Proposition 4 are met.
Correspondences between the notation in the two propositions are as in the previous proof:
d = N + 1; p = K; k = N; wt = [gt X
|
t ]
|; ￿ = [￿u;u]
K; ￿0 = ￿. Condition 1 in Proposi-










is non-di⁄erentiable only at ￿ = 0, but ￿ (Xt;b) is strictly positive and continuously di⁄eren-
tiable in b for any Xt, hence m(gt;Xt;b) is continuously di⁄erentiable in b and Condition 2 is
satis￿ed. Condition 3 is satis￿ed by requiring that 1 p
T
PT
t=1 m(gt;Xt;￿) converges in distrib-
ution to a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and full-rank covariance matrix S.
Since m(gt;Xt;b) is continuously di⁄erentiable in b on the compact [￿u;u]
K and gt and Xt







7.2 Approximations of R(Xt)
Outside the case of conditional normality, the speci￿cation







can approximate any su¢ ciently smooth functional form for R(Xt) to any desired degree of
accuracy. For example, provided some technical conditions are satis￿ed (see e.g. Judd - 1998),
the function:
￿(Xt) = log(R(Xt)) (37)
can be approximated to any degree of accuracy by tensor product bases. In fact, let ￿ =
f￿k (xi)g
1
k=1 be an orthogonal basis for real valued functions of one variable and ￿ a tensor

















N is the set of combinations of N natural numbers. Then, ￿(Xt) can be approximated










￿i i (Xt) (39)










where hi (Zit) = exp(Zit). Hence, the functional form (28) is approximately valid also for non-
normal gambles, provided one replaces the set of predictors Xt with a larger set Zt containing
non-linear functions of the components of Xt.
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298 Tables and Figures
Table 1 - Summary statistics and estimates of unconditional riskiness
General AAA AA A BBB Gov. S&P 500
Mean 0.0272 0.0284 0.0278 0.0268 0.0267 0.0284 0.0353
St. dev. 0.2985 0.2949 0.2931 0.3079 0.2994 0.2835 1.1196
Skew. -0.476 -0.481 -0.482 -0.555 -0.556 -0.270 -0.071
Kurt. 5.873 6.167 7.141 6.995 6.246 5.454 13.456
JB <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
b R 1.696 1.590 1.610 1.843 1.744 1.453 17.84
b R (st. dev.) 0.268 0.239 0.249 0.307 0.282 0.208 7.902
R (normal) 1.637 1.529 1.544 1.770 1.676 1.417 17.76
The table reports descriptive statistics of the daily returns on the general corporate bond index (General), its
four sub-indices (AAA, AA, A, BBB), the government bond index (Gov.) and the S&P 500 total return index.
JB is the p-value of the Jarque-Bera statistic. b R is the estimated index of riskiness, b R (st. dev.) is the standard
deviation of the estimate and R (normal) is the riskiness of a theoretical normal distribution of returns having
the same mean and variance as the real one. The sample period is from December 31st, 1988 to January 30th,
2009, for a total of 5200 daily observations.
30Table 2 - Pair-wise tests of equal riskiness (p-values)
AAA AA A BBB Gov. S&P 500
General 0.201 0.276 0.021 0.515 0.069 0.041
AAA 0.774 0.031 0.237 0.257 0.040
AA 0.034 0.325 0.240 0.040
A 0.406 0.027 0.043
BBB 0.052 0.042
The table reports the p-values of the test statistics obtained testing the hypothesis that two distributions of
asset returns are characterized by the same index of riskiness. The pair-wise tests are conducted on the following
indices: the general corporate bond index (General), its four sub-indices (AAA, AA, A, BBB), the government
bond index (Gov.) and the S&P 500 total return index. The sample period is from December 31st, 1988 to
January 30th, 2009, for a total of 5200 daily observations.
31Table 3 - Univariate models
General AAA AA A BBB
YTM -3.015 (0.935)￿￿￿ -2.247 (0.613)￿￿￿ -2.393 (0.840)￿￿￿ -2.200 (1.001)￿￿ -3.314 (0.940)￿￿￿
VOL 1.960 (0.332)￿￿￿ 1.961 (0.377)￿￿￿ 1.677 (0.382)￿￿￿ 2.197 (0.391)￿￿￿ 2.412 (0.303)￿￿￿
LIB3M -1.622 (0.574)￿￿￿ -1.267 (0.550)￿￿ -1.346 (0.556)￿￿ -1.579 (0.559)￿￿￿ -1.732 (0.597)￿￿￿
TRS3M -1.235 (0.457)￿￿￿ -0.986 (0.426)￿￿ -1.090 (0.462)￿￿ -1.180 (0.417)￿￿￿ -1.182 (0.440)￿￿￿
TRS10Y -2.193 (0.498)￿￿￿ -1.799 (0.473)￿￿￿ -1.755 (0.535)￿￿￿ -2.149 (0.477)￿￿￿ -2.382 (0.454)￿￿￿
SLOPE 14.98 (17.65) 19.56 (19.68) 22.48 (21.04) 18.23 (18.99) 10.42 (15.46)
TED 0.439 (0.153)￿￿￿ 0.251 (0.161) 0.299 (0.179)￿ 0.481 (0.161)￿￿￿ 0.524 (0.139)￿￿￿
SPTREND -1.271 (0.776) -0.684 (0.751) -0.860 (0.833) -1.460 (0.828)￿ -1.600 (0.724)￿￿
SPVOL 1.072 (0.499)￿￿ 0.822 (0.589) 0.552 (0.517) 1.156 (0.535)￿￿ 1.410 (0.458)￿￿￿
IP -7.366 (4.327)￿ -5.661 (3.799) -5.364 (4.086) -8.715 (4.431)￿￿ -8.041 (4.394)￿
UN -1.533 (2.271) -0.638 (1.641) 0.006 (1.535) -0.885 (2.285) -6.443 (4.608)
IJC 0.477 (0.895) 0.622 (0.857) 0.602 (0.941) 0.840 (0.933) 0.396 (1.886)
CPI -2.905 (12.52) -6.886 (10.87) 0.231 (12.43) 10.56 (11.84) 2.077 (12.81)
M1 -0.429 (6.154) 1.227 (4.540) 1.307 (4.687) -0.177 (7.133) -3.021 (9.023)
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates (t-statistics in parentheses) obtained from univariate models of riski-
ness. All models are estimated both for the general corporate bond index (General) and for its four sub-indices
(AAA, AA, A, BBB). For example, the coe¢ cient -2.247 found at the intersection of the YTM row and the AAA
column indicates that the riskiness of AAA bonds is predicted to be lower when the yield-to-maturity (YTM) is
higher. Each univariate model also includes a constant, whose estimate is not reported. ￿￿￿ indicates a p-value
below 1 per cent, ￿￿ below 5 per cent and ￿ below 10 per cent. The meaning of the acronyms in the ￿rst column
is reported in section 3.4. The sample period is from December 31st, 1988 to January 30th, 2009, for a total of
5200 daily observations.
32Table 4 - Multivariate models - General index
C YTM VOL CPI Coe⁄. Var. Var.
4.988 (1.135)￿￿￿ -1.385 (0.683)￿￿ 1.515 (0.375)￿￿￿ _ _ _
7.577 (2.040)￿￿￿ -3.182 (1.235)￿￿￿ 1.572 (0.452)￿￿￿ 35.19 (15.79)￿￿ _ _
7.809 (1.629)￿￿￿ -3.396 (0.982)￿￿￿ 1.975 (0.617)￿￿￿ 19.22 (16.95) 0.800 (0.637) LIB3M
7.448 (1.545)￿￿￿ -3.066 (0.949)￿￿￿ 2.462 (1.252)￿￿ 27.91 (11.69)￿￿ 0.843 (0.885) TRS3M
7.591 (2.061)￿￿￿ -3.217 (1.446)￿￿ 1.587 (0.457)￿￿￿ 35.05 (15.23)￿￿ 0.044 (0.713) TRS10Y
7.523 (2.168)￿￿￿ -2.726 (1.562)￿ 1.826 (0.615)￿￿￿ 27.51 (18.00) -18.23 (14.58) SLOPE
7.843 (2.074)￿￿￿ -3.250 (1.384)￿￿ 1.467 (0.550)￿￿￿ 29.94 (22.81) 0.221 (0.332) TED
7.759 (2.483)￿￿￿ -3.333 (1.599)￿￿ 1.478 (0.646)￿￿ 35.90 (17.53)￿￿ -0.298 (1.156) SPTREND
7.456 (2.202)￿￿￿ -3.147 (1.353)￿￿ 1.539 (0.484)￿￿￿ 35.96 (16.88)￿￿ 0.167 (0.561) SPVOL
7.580 (2.048)￿￿￿ -3.184 (1.231)￿￿￿ 1.571 (0.442)￿￿￿ 35.18 (15.83)￿￿ -0.021 (3.255) IP
8.921 (2.069)￿￿￿ -2.580 (1.227)￿￿ 1.731 (0.501)￿￿￿ 29.53 (14.17)￿￿ -1.260 (0.865) UN
13.62 (4.542)￿￿￿ -2.976 (1.129)￿￿￿ 1.681 (0.416)￿￿￿ 32.36 (12.70)￿￿ -1.059 (0.728) IJC
7.157 (1.970)￿￿￿ -2.789 (1.344)￿￿ 1.677 (0.529)￿￿￿ 30.67 (16.37)￿ -2.511 (4.488) M1
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates (t-statistics in parentheses) obtained from multivariate models of the
riskiness of the general corporate bond index. Each row refers to a di⁄erent model. All models (except the
￿rst one) include YTM, VOL and CPI as predictors, plus a fourth variable, indicated in the last column. The
penultimate column reports the coe¢ cient estimate for the fourth variable. Each multivariate model also includes
a constant (C). ￿￿￿ indicates a p-value below 1 per cent, ￿￿ below 5 per cent and ￿ below 10 per cent. The
meaning of the acronyms in the ￿rst row and last column is reported in section 3.4. The sample period is from
December 31st, 1988 to January 30th, 2009, for a total of 5200 daily observations.
33Table 5 - Over-identi￿ed multivariate models
General index
Non-zero Zero J-stat (p-val) MMSC-BIC MMSC-HQIC
C,YTM,VOL CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE 9.506 (0.002) -24.719 -8.5261
C,YTM,VOL,CPI LIB3M,TED,SLOPE 1.952 (0.162) -23.717 -11.5721
C,YTM,VOL,LIB3M CPI,TED,SLOPE 3.848 (0.049) -21.821 -9.676
C,YTM,VOL,TED CPI,LIB3M,SLOPE 2.496 (0.114) -23.173 -11.028
C,YTM,VOL,SLOPE CPI,LIB3M,TED 3.082 (0.079) -22.587 -10.442
A index
Non-zero Zero J-stat (p-val) MMSC-BIC MMSC-HQIC
C,YTM,VOL CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,UN 10.42 (0.001) -32.362 -12.120
C,YTM,VOL,CPI LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,UN 2.650 (0.103) -31.575 -19.890
C,YTM,VOL,LIB3M CPI,TED,SLOPE,UN 4.714 (0.029) -29.511 -17.826
C,YTM,VOL,TED CPI,LIB3M,SLOPE,UN 4.220 (0.039) -30.005 -18.320
C,YTM,VOL,SLOPE CPI,LIB3M,TED,UN 2.887 (0.089) -31.338 -19.653
C,YTM,VOL,UN CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE 6.050 (0.013) -28.176 -16.490
BBB index
Non-zero Zero J-stat (p-val) MMSC-BIC MMSC-HQIC
C,YTM,VOL CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,UN,IJC,M1 19.90 (0.000) -39.994 -11.656
C,YTM,VOL,CPI LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,UN,IJC,M1 12.01 (0.001) -39.328 -15.038
C,YTM,VOL,LIB3M CPI,TED,SLOPE,UN,IJC,M1 9.627 (0.002) -41.711 -17.421
C,YTM,VOL,TED CPI,LIB3M,SLOPE,UN,IJC,M1 10.66 (0.001) -40.678 -16.388
C,YTM,VOL,SLOPE CPI,LIB3M,TED,UN,IJC,M1 10.53 (0.001) -40.808 -16.518
C,YTM,VOL,UN CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,IJC,M1 8.987 (0.003) -42.351 -18.061
C,YTM,VOL,IJC CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,M1,UN 13.09 (0.000) -38.248 -13.958
C,YTM,VOL,M1 CPI,LIB3M,TED,SLOPE,UN,IJC 15.24 (0.000) -36.098 -11.808
The tables report the J-statistics obtained in the tests for over-identifying restrictions, used to perform model
selection with Andrews an Lu￿ s (2001) criterion. Each row refers to a di⁄erent model. The ￿rst column reports,
for each model, the variables that have a non-zero coe¢ cient, while the second lists the variables that have a zero
coe¢ cient but are used to form the over-identifying orthogonality restrictions. The last two columns report the
values of the Bayesian (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria. The meaning of the acronyms in the
￿rst and second columns is reported in section 3.4. The sample period is from December 31st, 1988 to January
30th, 2009, for a total of 5200 daily observations.
34Table 6 - Multivariate models - All indices
C YTM VOL Third variable Coe¢ cient
General 7.577 (2.040)￿￿￿ -3.182 (1.235)￿￿￿ 1.572 (0.452)￿￿￿ CPI 35.19 (15.79)￿￿
AAA 4.257 (0.857)￿￿￿ -1.037 (0.534)￿ 1.572 (0.457)￿￿￿ _ _
AA 5.834 (1.544)￿￿￿ -2.281 (0.949)￿￿ 1.650 (0.516)￿￿￿ CPI 32.23 (17.73)￿
A 7.593 (2.204)￿￿￿ -3.231 (1.406)￿￿ 1.663 (0.487)￿￿￿ CPI 40.15 (18.39)￿￿
BBB 10.07 (3.006)￿￿￿ -1.431 (1.039) 1.776 (0.402)￿￿￿ UN -2.583 (0.952)￿￿￿
The table reports, for each index, the coe¢ cient estimates (t-statistics in parentheses) of the multivariate
models selected by Andrews an Lu￿ s (2001) criterion. Each row refers to a di⁄erent index. All models (except the
￿rst one) include YTM and VOL as predictors, plus (eventually) a third variable, indicated in the penultimate
column. The last column reports the coe¢ cient estimate for the third variable. Each multivariate model also
includes a constant (C). ￿￿￿ indicates a p-value below 1 per cent, ￿￿ below 5 per cent and ￿ below 10 per cent.
The meaning of the acronyms in the ￿rst row is reported in section 3.4. The sample period is from December
31st, 1988 to January 30th, 2009, for a total of 5200 daily observations.


























































Riskiness (left-hand axis) Variance (right-hand axis)
The ￿gure plots the conditional variance of returns and the conditional riskiness of the general corporate bond
index, estimated with a multivariate model selected by Andrews and Lu￿ s (2001) criterion and containing three
predictors: the average yield-to-maturity of the corporate bonds, an adaptive forecast of the conditional volatility
and CPI in￿ation. Values of riskiness are on the left-hand axis and values of variance are on the right-hand axis.
The sample period is from December 31st, 1988 to January 30th, 2009, for a total of 5200 daily observations.
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The ￿gure plots the sample cumulative distributions of returns on the general corporate bond index, con-
ditional on the yield-to maturity (YTM) being above or below its median. Returns are on the abscissae and
cumulative probabilities are on the ordinates. The sample period is from December 31st, 1988 to January 30th,
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